Abstract. In a multi-objective game, each agent individually evaluates each overall action-profile on multiple objectives. I generalize the price of anarchy to multiobjective games and provide a polynomial-time algorithm to assess it 1 . This work asserts that policies on tobacco promote a higher economic efficiency.
Introduction
Economic agents, for each individual decision, make a trade off between multiple objectives, like for instance: time, resources, goods, financial income, sustainability, happiness and life. This motivated the introduction of a super-class of games: multi-objective (MO) games [5, 22] . Each agent evaluates each overall action profile by a vector. His individual preference is a partial rationality modelled by the Pareto-dominance. It induces Pareto-Nash-equilibria (PN) as the overall selfish outcomes. Furthermore, concerning economic models, such vectorial evaluations are a humble backtrack from the intrinsic and subjective theories of value, towards a non-theory of value where the evaluations are maintained vectorial, in order to enable partial rationalities and to avoid losses of information in the model. In this more realistic (behaviourally less assumptive) framework, in order to avoid critical losses of information on the several objectives in the model, thoroughly computing efficiency is a tremendous necessity [13, 23] .
The literature on MO games is disparate and will be presented where relevant. After the preliminaries below, Section 2 generalizes the coordination ratio (CR, better known as "price of anarchy") to MO games. Section 3 applies it to the efficiency of tobacco economy. Section 4 provides algorithms 1 to assess the MO-CR. Let N = {1, . . . , n} denote the set of agents. Let A i denote each agent i's actionset (discrete, finite). Each agent i decides an action a i ∈ A i . Given a subset of agents M ⊆ N , let A M denote × i∈M A i and let A = A N denote the set of overall actionprofiles. Let O = {1, , . . . , d} denote the set of all the objectives, with d fixed. Let v i : A → R d + denote an agent i's individual MO evaluation function, which maps each overall action-profile a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∈ A to an MO evaluation v i (a) ∈ R d + . Hence, agent i's evaluation for objective k is v i k (a) ∈ R + . Given an overall action-profile a ∈ A, a M is the restriction of a to A M , and a −i to A N \{i} .
Definition 1. A Multi-objective Game (MOG) is a tuple
For instance, MO games encompass single-objective (discrete) optimization problems, MO optimization problems and non-cooperative games. Assuming α = |A i | ∈ N for each agent, the representation of an MOG requires nα n d-dimensional vectors.
The Pareto-dominance is a partial order, inducing a multiplicity of Pareto-efficient outcomes. Formally, the set of efficient vectors is defined as follows:
} denote the subset of worst vectors.) Pareto-efficiency enables to define as efficient all the trade-offs that cannot be improved on one objective without being downgraded on another one, that is: the best compromises between objectives (see e.g. Figure 1 ).
At the individual scale, Pareto-efficiency defines a partial rationality, enabling to model behaviours that single-objective (SO) games would not model consistently.
Definition 3 (Pareto-Nash equilibrium [22] ). In an MOG, an action-profile a ∈ A is a Pareto-Nash equilibrium (denoted by a ∈ PN), if and only if, for each agent i ∈ N :
Pareto-Nash equilibria encompass most behaviourally possible action-profiles. For instance, whatever an agent's subjective linear positive weighted combination of the objectives, his decision is Pareto-efficient. One can distinguish behavioural objectives inducing PN and also objectives on which to focus an efficiency study. Equilibrium existence. In many sound probabilistic settings [7, 8, 18] , Pareto efficiency is not demanding on the conditions of individual rationality, hence there are multiple Pareto-efficient responses. Consequently, pure PN are numerous in average:
, justifying their existence in a probabilistic manner. Furthermore, in MO games with MO potentials [15, 17, 19] , the existence is guaranteed.
Example 1 (A didactic toy-example in Ocean Shores). Five shops in Ocean Shores (the nodes) can decide upon two activities: renting bikes or buggies, selling clams or fruits, etc. Each agent evaluates his local action-profile depending on the actions of his innerneighbours and according to two objectives: financial revenue and sustainability. ) ∈ PN, since each of these individual actions, given the adversary local action profile (column), is Pareto-efficient among the two actions of the agent (row). Even if the relative values of the objectives cannot be certainly ascertained, all the subjectively efficient vectors are encompassed by the individual Pareto-efficiency. In this MO game, there are 13 Pareto-Nash-equilibria, which utilitarian evaluations are depicted in Figure 1 (Section 2).
The Multi-objective Coordination Ratio
It is well known in game theory that an equilibrium can be overall inefficient with regard to the sum of the individual evaluations. This loss of efficiency is measured by the coordination ratio 2 (CR) [3, 4, 6, 10, 12, 20, 21] 
Regrettably, when focusing on one sole objective (e.g. making money or a higher GDP), there are losses of efficiency that are not measured (e.g. non-sustainability of productions or production of addictive carcinogens). This appeals for a more thorough analysis of the loss of efficiency at equilibrium and the definition of a multi-objective coordination ratio.
The utilitarian social welfare u :
+ is a vector-valued function measuring social welfare with respect to the d objectives: u(a) = i∈N v i (a), excluding the purely behavioural objectives that cause irrationality [23] . Given a function f :
y}. I also introduce 3 the notations E and F, illustrated in Figures 1 and 3 :
For SO games, the worst-case efficiency of equilibria is measured by the CR min[u(P E)]/ max[u(A)]. However, for MO games, there are many equilibria and optima, and a ratio of the (green) set E over the (red) set F is not defined yet and ought to maintain the information on each objective without introducing dictatorial choices. Definition 4 (MO Coordination Ratio). Given an MOG, a vector ρ ∈ R d + bounds the MOG's inefficiency if and only if it holds that: ∀y ∈ E, ∃z ∈ F, y/z ρ. Consequently, the set of guaranteed ratios is defined by:
and the MO-CR is defined by: the overall efficiency should be is left free (no dictatorship) which results in several ratios in the MO-CR. Firstly, for each ρ ∈ R[E, F], we have ρ 1 ≤ 65%. Hence, whatever the choices of overall efficiency, one cannot guarantee more than 65% of efficiency on objective 1. Secondly, there are some subjectivities for which the efficiency on objective 2 is already total (100%, if not more) while situation on objective 1 is worse and only 50% can be obtained. Thirdly, from 50% to 65% of subjective efficiency on objective 1, the various subjectivities range the efficiency on objective 2 from 100% to 75%.
Fig. 2: The MO-CR of Ocean Shores
Having ρ in MO-CR means that for each y ∈ E, there is an efficient outcome z (y) ∈ F such that y dominates ρ z (y) . In other words, if ρ ∈ R[E, F], then each equilibrium satisfies the ratio of efficiency ρ. This means that equilibria-outcomes are at least as good as ρ F. That is:
Moreover, since ρ is tight, E sticks to ρ F. 5 seconds) . Meanwhile, addictive satisfaction and the financial revenue of the tobacco industry fosters consumption and production. According to the subjective theory of value [24] , some economists would say: "Since consumers value the product, then the industry creates value." According to other health economists [23] , most consumers become addict before age 18, and as adults, would prefer a healthier life, but fail to opt-out.
The theory of MO games, based on a non-theory of value, just maintains vectorial evaluations and properly considers dollars, addiction and life expectancy as distinct objectives, with PN equilibria encompassing the relevant behaviours, even irrational. We modelled the tobacco industry and its consumers [1, 13] by a succinct MOG, with the help of (..) the association 4 "Alliance contre le tabac". The set of agents is N = {industry, ν consumers}, where there are about ν = 6.10 9 prospective consumers. Each consumer decides in A consumer = {not-smoking, smoking} and cares about money, his addictive pleasure, and living. The industry only cares about money and decides in A industry = {not-active, active, advertise&active}. We have O = {money, reward, life-expectancy}. The tables below depict the evaluation vectors (over a life-time and ordered as in O) of one prospective consumer and the evaluations of the industry with respect to the number θ ∈ {0, . . . , ν} of consumers who decide to smoke. The money budget (already an aggregation) is expressed in kilo-dollars 56 ; the addictive reward is on an ordinal scale {1, 2, 3, 4}; life-expectancy is in years. 
Pareto-Nash equilibria. If the industry is active, then for the consumer, deciding to smoke or not depends on how the consumer subjectively values/weighs money, addiction and life expectancy: both decisions are encompassed by Pareto-efficiency. For the industry, advertise&active is a dominant strategy. Consequently, Pareto-Nash-equilibria are all the action-profiles in which the industry decides advertise&active. Efficiency. Since addiction is irrational (detailed in Appendix C), I focus on money and life-expectancy. We have E = {θ(36, 55) + (ν − θ)(48, 75) | 0 ≤ θ ≤ ν} and F = {ν(48, 75)}, where ν is the world's population, and θ the number of smokers. Since WST[E] = {(36, 55)}, the MO-CR is the singleton {(75%, 73%)}: in the worst case, we lose 12k$ and 20 years of life-expectancy per-consumer. These Pareto-Nashequilibria are the worst action-profiles for money and life-expectancy, a critical information that was not lost by this MOG and its MO-CR. Practical lessons. Advertising tobacco fosters consumption. The association "Alliance contre le tabac" passed a law for standardized neutral packets (April 3rd 2015), in order to annihilate all the benefits of branding, but only in France. The model indicates that:
This law will promote a higher economic efficiency.
Computation of the MO-CR
In this section, I provide a polynomial-time algorithm for the computation of MO-CR which relies on a very general procedure based on two phases:
1. Given a MOG, compute the worst equilibria WST[E] and the efficient outcomes F.
Given WST[E] and F, compute MO-CR
Depending on the input (normal form or compact representation), it adapts as follows. 
Computation of the MO-CR for Multi-objective Normal Forms
Having specified Phase 1 and 2 for normal forms, Theorem 1 follows:
Theorem 1 (Computation of MO-CR). Given a MO normal form, one can compute the MO-CR in polynomial time
O(L 4d−2 ). If d = 2, it lowers to O(L 4 log 2 (L)).
Computation of the MO-CR for Multi-objective Compact Representations
Compact representations of massively multi-agent games (e.g. MO graphical games, MO action-graph games) have a representation length L that is polynomial with respect to the number of agents n and the sizes of the action-sets α. As q = |WST[E]| and m = |F| can be exponentials α n of this representation length, compact representations are algorithmically more challenging, leaving open the computation of WST[E] and F in Phase 1, and complicating the use of Algorithm 1 in Phase 2. To overcome this, one can do MO approximations [16] , by implementing an approximate Phase 1 which precision transfers to Phase 2 in polynomial time, as follows. Lemma 1. Given ε 1 , ε 2 > 0 and approximations E of E and F of F in the sense that:
∀y ∈ E, ∃y ∈ E, y y and ∀y ∈ E, ∃y ∈ E, (1 + ε 1 )y y (3) ∀z ∈ F, ∃z ∈ F, z z and ∀z ∈ F, ∃z ∈ F,
Equations (3) and (4) state approximation bounds. Equations (3) state that (1 + ε 1 ) −1 E bounds below E which bounds below E. Equations (4) state that F bounds below F which bounds below (1 + ε 2 )F. Crucially, whatever the sizes of E and F, there exist such approximations E and
, yielding the approximation scheme below.
Theorem 2 (Approximation Scheme for MO-CR).
Given a compact MOG of representation length L, precisions ε 1 , ε 2 > 0 and two algorithms to compute approximations E of E and F of F in the sense of Equations (3) and (4) that take time θ E (ε 1 , L) and θ F (ε 2 , L), one can approximate R[E, F] in the sense of Equation (5) in time:
For MO graphical games, Phase 1 could be instantiated with approximate junction-tree algorithms on MO graphical models [9] . For MO symmetric action-graph games, in the same fashion, one could generalize existing algorithms [11] . More generally, for WST[E] and F, one can also use meta-heuristics with experimental guarantees.
Prospects
Multi-objective games can be used as a behaviourally more realistic framework to model a wide set of games occurring in business situations ranging from carpooling websites to combinatorial auctions. Also, studying the efficiency of MO generalizations of routing or Cournot-competitions [10] could provide realistic economic insights.
A Why Smoothness will not work on multi-objective games
Most single-objective price of anarchy analytic results rely on a smoothness-analysis [20] . A crucial step for "smoothness" is to sum the best response inequalities: For a single-objective game and an equilibrium a ∈ PN, from the best-response con-
However, the Pareto-Nash-equilibrium conditions are rather:
As shown in the following counter-example, such relations cannot be summed:
Consequently, Smoothness-analysis does not encompass Pareto-Nash equilibria, regardless of the efficiency measurement chosen.
B Properties of the Multi-objective Coordination Ratio
The Multi-objective Coordination Ratio fulfils a list of key good properties for the thorough measurement of the multi-objective efficiency of MO games.
B.1 Worst case guarantee on equilibria outcomes and No dictatorship on efficient outcomes
Each vectorial efficiency ratio that the MO-CR states, bounds below the efficiency for each equilibrium outcome, compared to an existing efficient outcome:
∀ρ ∈ MO-CR[E, F], ∀y ∈ E, ∃z ∈ F, y/z ρ
The process of measuring efficiency by MO-CR does not imply any choice in F that would impose a point-of-view telling what efficiency should be (e.g. no five-year plans).
B.2 Multi-objective ratio-scale
Given E, F and r ∈ R d ++ , it holds that:
Equation (6) states that the MO-CR is expressed in the multi-objective space. It is worth noting that while MO-CR[E, F] ⊆ [0, 1] d is a more classical choice, MO-CR also allows for measurements of over-efficiencies. (E.g. if F is a family-car and E is a Lamborghini, then there is over-efficiency on the speed objective.)
Equations (7), (8) and (9) state that MO-CR is sensitive on each objective to multiplications of the outcomes. For instance, if E is three times better on objective k, then so is MO-CR. If there are twice better opportunities of efficiency in F on objective k , then MO-CR is one half on objective k . In other words, the efficiency of each objective independently reflects into the MO-CR in a ratio-scale.
If all equilibria outcomes are efficient (i.e. E ⊆ F), then this must imply that according to the MO-CR, the MO game is fully efficient, that is: (1, . . . , 1) ∈ MO-CR[E, F]. The MO-CR seems to be the only multi-objective ratio-scale measurement that fulfils Equation (10) while being a worst case guarantee on equilibria outcomes with no dictatorship on what efficiency should be.
It is also worth noting that MO-CR is MO-monotonic with respect to E and
C Bounded Rationality in Tobacco Consumption
According to the intrinsic theory of value [2] , the value of a cigarette objectively amounts to the quantities of raw materials used for its production, or is the combination of the labour times put into it [14] . However, each economic agent needs to keep the freedom to evaluate and act how he pleases, in order to keep his good will and some economic efficiency, as observed in the end of the Soviet Union. According to the subjective theory of value [2] , the value of a cigarette amounts to the price an agent is willing to pay for it. Since the consumers value the product, then the industry creates value [24] . However, this disregards what the disastrous consequence is on life expectancy, belittles 7.500.000 deaths-per-year and emphasizes the bounded rationality of behaviours. While for some health economists, consuming a cigarette is a rational choice, as one values pleasure more than life expectancy, for others, consumers are stuck into addiction before becoming adults. The truth is likely between these two extreme points of view [23] : Economic agents discount the future at a rate of 6% per-year, hence a day of life in 40 years is valued 10 times less than now, leading to overweighting the actual smoking pleasure and to irrational behaviours with respect to preferences over a full lifetime. Agents behave according to objectives (e.g. addictive satisfaction) that they would avoid if they had the full experience of their lifetime (e.g. a lung cancer with probability 1/2) and a sufficient will (e.g. quit smoking). Time discounting also explains other non-sustainable behaviours like over-fishing catastrophes. 
D Proofs
Given two descriptions of cones x 1 , x 2 ∈ R d + , we have:
where
Given two descriptions of cone-unions X 1 , X 2 ⊆ R d + , we have:
+ . Therefore, (C, ∪, ∩) is stable, and then is a set-algebra.
